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Abstract. A sizable literature has grown up in recent years focusing on two-sided mar-
kets in which economies of scale combined with complementarities between a platform
and its associated ‘software’ or ‘services’ can generate indirect network effects (that is
positive feedback between the number of consumers using that platform and the utility
of an individual consumer). In this paper we introduce a model of ‘porting’ in such mar-
kets where porting denotes the conversion of ‘software’ or ‘services’ developed for one
platform to run on another. Focusing on the case where a dominant platform exists we
investigate the impact on equilibrium and the consequences for welfare of the ability to
control porting. Specifically, we show that the welfare costs associated with the ‘control
of porting’ may be more significant than those arising from pricing alone. This model
and its associated results are of particular relevance because of the light they shed on
debates about the motivations and effects of actions by a dominant platform owner. Re-
cent examples of such debates include those about Microsoft’s behaviour both in relation
to its operating system and its media player, Apple’s behaviour in relation to its DRM
and iTunes platform, and Ebay’s use of the cyber-trespass doctrine to prevent access to
its site.
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1. Introduction
Several recent cases, which we discuss in more detail below, have focused economists’
attention on the motivations and effects of the behaviour of a dominant firm in two-sided
markets. We believe that much of this activity can usefully be interpreted in terms of
efforts to control (and prevent) ‘porting’ – where porting denotes the conversion of a
‘software’ or ‘service’ associated with one platform to run on another platform. Building
on the existing literature on two-sided markets we develop a formal model of ‘porting’ and,
focusing on the case where a dominant platform exists, we use this model to investigate the
impact on equilibrium and the consequences for welfare of the ability to control porting.
Specifically, we show that the welfare costs associated with the ‘control of porting’ may
be more significant than those arising from pricing alone. These results are of particular
importance for two reasons. First, in their general implications for the evaluation of
dominant firm behaviour. Second, for the insights gained into strategic behaviour in two-
sided markets and their consequences for welfare. Such insights are particularly germane
given the growing importance of markets exhibiting network effects.
For example, much of the 1998 case of US vs. Microsoft as well as more recent antitrust
disputes in Europe over Microsoft’s media player can be seen as related to efforts to control
porting. In the 1998 case there was the alleged tying of Internet Explorer browser as well
as efforts to undermine compatibility with other systems, for example, by subtly changing
the Windows version of the Java Virtual Machine (Jackson, 1999). Similarly, the media
player dispute concerned the bundling of Microsoft’s own Media Player ‘for free’ with the
operating system. In both cases there has been considerable debate1 over the motivations
for, and consequences of, Microsoft’s behaviour, especially as to whether these sorts of
activities could be described as ‘tying’.2 To our mind much of this behaviour is best seen
in light of efforts to control porting and thereby preserve the market power associated
with the ‘Applications Barrier to Entry’ (as the indirect network effects were termed in
that anti-trust action). Unlike with traditional tying, Microsoft’s actions, though obviously
directly affecting competing applications (Netscape’s Browser, Real Networks Audioplayer
1See, for example, Hall and Hall (2000); Davis and Murphy (2000); Fisher (2000); Bresnahan (2001);
Liebowitz and Margolis (1999); Klein (2001); Gilbert and Katz (2001).
2See the works previously cited and, specifically on the tying issues, Whinston (1990); Bernheim and
Whinston (1998) and the survey in Whinston (2001).
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etc), were not directed at them. Rather, they were motivated by the fear that losing control
of key Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) and user services would make it easier
for end-user applications and services to move (port) between operating system platforms,
which would, in turn, make it easier for consumers to switch between different platforms
and thereby reduce Microsoft’s market power.3
Another example is provided by the 2000 case of eBay vs. Bidder’s Edge.4 Here, eBay,
an online auction site, successfully sued Bidder’s Edge, a firm which collected together
prices from different auction site for consumers to compare, for cyber-trespass, ostensibly
on the grounds that Bidder’s Edge spidering activities caused excessive load on their
servers. However, as various commentators pointed out the ability to exclude a firm
such as Bidder’s Edge could also have serious anti-competitive effects5. EBay is a classic
example of a platform in a two-sided market with sellers taking the role of ‘software’
or ‘service’ and buyers that of consumers. If a third-party were easily able to transfer
(port) sellers from one auction platform to another then eBay’s market power would be
greatly diminished. A firm such as Bidder’s Edge would greatly facilitate such ‘porting’
by ensuring that a given seller (and their associated ‘reputation’) would be visible to
consumers no matter what auction platform they were on. By preventing Bidder’s Edge
(and any other similar firm) from being able to extract data from the eBay site without
permission eBay obtained very substantial control of porting from its platform.
A final example comes from the ongoing debate in Europe around interoperability of
TPMs/DRMs (Technological Protection Measures/Digital Rights Management systems)
systems, particularly in relation to Apple’s dominant position with its iPod and iTunes
systems both of which use Apple’s proprietary ‘FairPlay’ DRM. Here the platform is
the digital music player and the ‘software’ is the music with Apple’s offerings being the
iPod or iTunes software on the platform side and the iTunes Music Store (ITMS) on the
3This also explains why Microsoft only ‘integrates/ties’ certain applications and is happy for most software
to be produced by third-party vendors. The need to tie only arises when that application or service will
itself be the site of significant third-party development. This is clearly the case with web-browsers, as Bill
Gates presciently saw in his ‘Internet Tidal Wave’ memorandum: “A new competitor ‘born’ on the Internet
is Netscape [Netscape was launched 15th Dec 1994]. Their browser is dominant with 70% usage share,
allowing them to determine what network extensions will catch on. They are pursuing a multi-platform
strategy where they move the key API into the client to commoditize the underlying operating system ...”
(emphasis added).
4EBAY, Inc vs. BIDDER’S EDGE Inc, http://pub.bna.com/lw/21200.htm.
5See, for example, the amicus curiae brief filed by a collection of 28 law professors available online at
http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/iclp/ebay-ml.
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‘software’ (music) side of the market. If DRM were interoperable then you could play
a song from any given digital music store on any given digital music player. However
with no interoperability if someone buys all their songs from the iTunes Music Store
(currently with 70-80% of the digital downloads market) then they can only play them
on an iPod (and if they change music player they may lose all their purchased music).
Without this obstacle it would be substantially easier for consumers to switch platforms
(i.e. digital music players). Thus, by having a closed DRM and integrating backwards into
the ‘software’ (music) market (analogously to the previous Microsoft examples) Apple are
able to effectively control porting and thereby increase their market power in the platform
market.6
The paper builds upon several strands in the existing literature. First, there is the
existing work on ‘converters’ in network markets (converters being devices that allow a
user on one network to gain access to a separate network). For example, Farrell and
Saloner (1992) examine the provision and purchase of imperfect converters in a network
effects model, as well as the incentive for a dominant firm to make conversion costly.7 As
porting can be seen as the analogous activity in a two-sided market with ‘indirect network
effects’ to converters in the original ‘one-sided’ models our work can be seen as extending
this existing work to the more complex two-sided case.
The second strand is the literature on indirect network effects and two-sided markets.
Early work by Church and Gandal (1992) (extended by Church, Gandal, and Krause
(2003)) analyzed the case where consumers cared about the variety of complementary
goods available for a particular platform or network. They showed that with fixed costs
in production this led to ‘indirect network effects’, that is a positive relation between the
utility of a consumer from a given platform and the number of other consumers joining
that platform. This work has recently been extended and generalized under the heading
of two-sided markets, see Armstrong (2005); Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2005). The focus
of much of this literature has been on the charging decisions of the platform owner –
in particular, the form of fees and what determines the fee, and subsidy, levels on the
two sides (the ‘software’ side and the consumer side). By contrast, in this paper we are
6It is important to note for this analysis that it is well-known that Apple make their profits on the hardware
(the iPod) and make very little from the iTunes Music Store.
7See also Choi (1997) for another converter model, albeit a dynamic one related to the transition from an
old to a new technology.
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interested in something rather different: what happens if one platform owner can influence
the availability of ‘software’ on the other platform by controlling porting (that is the ability
of ‘software’ to multi-home).
Seen in this light, the closest work to ours in the existing two-sided literature are the
papers of Armstrong and Wright (2005) and Choi (2006). Armstrong and Wright (2007)
provides a general examination of two-sided markets with multi-homing and they examine
the use of exclusive contracts by a platform owner as means to force single-homing on the
seller side. However, due to the complexity of the analysis in the full two-sided the case
the authors fall back to analyzing the case of pure network effects.8 Our model differs from
this in several ways. First, rather than exclusive contracts we have a general ‘porting cost’
variable which influences the ability of ‘software’ produced for one platform to move to
the other. Second, we allow for ex-ante asymmetry in platform’s market share and general
forms for both heterogeneity and indirect network effects. Like Armstrong and Wright
(2005), the fully general case is too complex for ready analysis and so the price we pay
to keep the model tractable is that we restrict platform’s pricing decisions to some extent
and focus on case of a single proprietary (and dominant) platform facing a competitive
platform.
In a rather different model, primarily animated by the Media Player case, Choi (2006)
examines tying with multi-homing on the buyer (consumer) side. Here, tying is about the
ability for a firm with a monopoly in some underlying market to use tying to monopolized
a related two-sided platform (for example Microsoft using its operating system monopoly
to control the Media Player platform). With multi-homing on the buyer side Choi finds
that the welfare effects of tying are ambiguous with tying in some cases being welfare
improving. Our concerns are rather different. First, we have ‘porting’ (multi-homing) on
the ‘software’ (seller) side, not the consumer (buyer) side, of the market. Second, and
more importantly, the ‘tying’ in our model is between the platform and its associated
‘software’, not between some outside product and the platform.
Finally, our paper obviously has commonalities with the literature on tying and vertical
foreclosure (see e.g. Whinston (1990); Bernheim and Whinston (1998)). Due to the
8The focus on the case of symmetric platforms which be problematic when analyzing tying, as the authors
state (p. 22): ‘Given the underlying symmetry of firms in our model, it is not obvious that exclusive
contracts are advantageous to the platforms in equilibrium.’
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prominence of the tying issue in the Microsoft case there has been a flurry of papers
on tying models. Perhaps the closest, at least in spirit, to the model presented here is
that of Gilbert and Katz (2007) who investigate what they term ‘technological’ tying by
a monopolist. Increasing porting cost in our model could be seen as analogous to the
’technological’ tying in their model whereby the quality of a complementor can be reduced
by the monopolist. That said, technological tying is similar to traditional tying in that it
is motivated by a desire to sell the complementary good (or the bundle) whereas in the
case of porting examined here that is not the case: the monopolist simply wishes to inhibit
complementors from porting to another platform in order to reduce competition with its
own platform. Integration, if it happens at all, may occur not because it is profitable in
itself – it may even be loss-making – but only because it reduces the degree of platform
competition.
2. The Model
The basic framework is that used in the two-sided markets literature (see e.g. Armstrong
(2005)). There are two platforms/networks: X = A,B and a mass of consumers (buyers)
modelled by the interval [0, 1] with the index, t ∈ [0, 1], used to label them. The measure
of consumers on platform X is denoted by nX . Each platform has an associated set of
‘software/services’ (‘sellers’) and the amount of ‘software’ available on platform X is sX .
Consumers derive utility from using software and must purchase access to a platform to
be able to use the associated software.9 Consumers are heterogeneous in their preferences
for a given platform.10 If a consumer has already purchased ‘software’ from one platform
she gains no extra utility from purchasing from a second platform so a consumer will
purchase from at most one platform (there is no multi-homing on the buyer side). We also
make the standard assumption that all consumers join one or other platform.
Formally, consumers have the following utility function:
uX(t, pX , sX , psX) = φ− pX − hX(t) + usX(sX , psX)
9There are no ‘direct’ network effects, that is consumers’ utility from a given platform is affected directly
only by the platform itself and the amount of software available on it and not by the number of other
consumers using that platform. It would not be difficult to incorporate direct effects into our model but
as that is not the focus of our analysis here we have chosen to omit them for the sake of simplicity.
10This could be taken as encapsulating general differences in the type of software available on the two
platforms.
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Where
• φ is a positive constant introduced so that reservation utility can be normalized
to 0 (alternatively one could remove φ from utility function and set reservation
utility to −φ)
• pX is the price of hardware on platform X
• hX(t) models consumer heterogeneity. It is assumed that heterogeneity is sym-
metric across platforms that is, hB(1 − t) = hA(t). This allows one to write
hA(t) = h(t) = hB(1 − t). We shall assume the standard ‘orderability’ of con-
sumers by heterogeneity, i.e. h′(t) > 0. Thus we have a standard linear city model
with platform A at 0 and platform B at 1 and consumers preferring, all other
things being equal, a closer platform.
• usX is utility from software purchases with sX the amount of software available on
platform X and psX the price (or vector of prices) of software. This is discussed
further below.
Platform A is controlled by a single firm, the monopolist (M). Platform B is provided
competitively. Platform fixed costs are assumed to be sunk and therefore may be taken
without loss of generality to be zero. Marginal costs of access per consumer, c, are constant
and the same for each platform. Since platform B is perfectly competitive the access price
equals marginal cost: pB = c. Since the marginal cost is common across the two platforms
we may, without loss of generality, set c = 0.
2.1. Software Production and Porting. The software that is produced may be created
by two methods. Either it can be created directly for platform X at fixed cost fdX or it can
be ported from the other platform at fixed cost fp (note that this only relates to the fixed
cost, the marginal cost is the same whether the software is ported or created directly).
In our model we will suppose that a monopolist may increase the cost of porting from
its platform to a competitor’s – though at the cost of some expenditure on its own part.
Formally, if e is expenditure then fp = fp(e). It will be convenient in what follows to have
the porting cost, fp, being the choice variable rather than expenditure, e. This simply
involves using the inverse function (the expenditure to prevent porting), e = e(fp). Efforts
to prevent porting display diminishing returns so e′(fp) > 0, e′′(fp) > 0.
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Thus the fixed cost of software production on a platform, fX , will be either: fdX if all
software is produced directly (none is ported); a mixture of fdX and f
p if some software is
ported and some produced directly; or fp if all software is ported.
2.2. Sequence of Actions.
(1) The monopolist, M, chooses values for control variables: pA, fp.
(2) Software producers for each platform form expectations of platform size. Based
on these expectations they decide whether to engage in software production (be it
via porting or direct production) and, if so, what price to charge.
(3) Taking the resulting level of software provision and prices as given consumers solve
their utility maximization problem and decide from which platform to purchase.
(4) M’s profits, Π = pA · nA(pA, fp)− e(fp), are determined.
Remark 1. In equilibrium the resulting platform sizes must be consistent with rational ex-
pectations. That is: actual and expected platform sizes are equal and actual and expected
software levels are equal. In this case the order in which software firms and consumers
move does not affect the outcome of the model. Thus we could as easily have software
firms taking their decisions after consumers or even simultaneously.
3. Solving the Model
We take a general approach in which we assume only that software production on
platform X involves (a) some form of fixed costs (fX) (b) that the amount and price of
software on platform X may be expressed solely in terms of these fixed costs, fX and the
number of consumers on the platform, nX . Taken together these mean that the consumer
software utility function has a reduced form of the following kind:
usX(sX , p
s
X) = u
s
X(sX(fX , nX), p
s
X(fX , nX) ≡ νX(fX , nX), νfX < 0, νnX > 0
We shall term νX the ‘indirect network effects’ function on platform X.11 By proceed-
ing in this manner the results are kept as general as possible. Furthermore, the two basic
models of imperfect competition with fixed costs (monopolistic competition and product
differentiation) can both be shown to give rise to this reduced form (Appendix B provides
11Note that we implicitly assume some symmetry across platforms in that the function ν is the same across
the two platforms.
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an explicit derivation for the case of a standard circular city model of product differenti-
ation).
As presented we now have a standard two-sided model with utility functions:
uX(t, pX , fX , nX) = φ− pX − hX(t) + ν(fX , nX)
We can solve this in the usual manner to obtain platform sizes as a function of the
monopolist’s choice variables: nA = nA(pA, fp).12 The monopolist then solves:
maxpA,fp pAnA(pA, f
p)− e(fp).
3.1. Solving for the Subgame Equilibrium. We solve first for the equilibrium plat-
form size in the consumer/software subgame (stage 2 onwards, that is after M has set
prices and porting cost). We proceed by the usual method based on finding the marginal
consumer indifferent between the two platforms.
First, recall that we have assumed that consumers gain no extra utility from purchasing
from more than one platform. Thus, we may assume that consumers purchase at most
one platform. We also assumed that all consumers do purchase from one or other plat-
form. Thus we have nB = 1 − nA and we need only consider nA in what follows. For
notational convenience suppress auxiliary variables in the consumer utility functions and
write uX(t, pX , fX , nX) = uX(t, nX).
Define: the conditional utility advantage of platform A over platform B for consumer t
when platform size is nA:
Aˆ(t, nA) = uA(t, nA)− uB(t, 1− nA)
and the utility advantage (function), which gives the utility advantage of platform A
over B if t is the marginal consumer (so t = nX):
A(t) = Aˆ(t, t)
Using the expression for the utility function we have that:
A(t) = −pA − hA(t) + hB(t) + ν(fA, t)− ν(fB, 1− t)
12nA will also depend on other variables such as the direct cost of software production but these are
exogenous variables not under the control of any player.
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Lemma 2. The equilibria of the subgame from stage 2 onwards (after M sets price and
porting costs) are given by E = E0 ∪ E−0 where E0 is the set of interior equilibrium,
E0 = {t : A(t) = 0}, and E−0 is the set of extremal or ‘standardization’ equilibrium in
which all consumers join one or other platform, E−0 = {0 : A(0) < 0} ∪ {1 : A(1) > 0}.
An equilibrium te ∈ E0 is stable if A′(te) < 0. All te ∈ E−0 are stable.
Proof. See appendix. 
Note that the advantage function implicitly depends on all of our exogenous and choice
variables: A(t) = A(t, pA, fA, fB) and therefore so does the set of equilibria E = E(pA, fA, fB).
We make the following assumption about the existence of an equilibrium to this subgame:
Assumption: With pA = 0 and porting cost at its initial values (that is without any
intervention by M) there exists an asymmetric stable interior equilibrium where platform
A is larger than B.
Justification: without a stable equilibrium of the subgame the overall game will clearly
have no equilibrium. Thus we must have the existence of at least one stable equilibrium
of the subgame.13 We require the existence of an interior stable equilibrium to the sub-
game for two reasons. First, in most real-world scenarios, even those that involve a very
dominant platform, we rarely see a platform with 100% market share. Second, at an ex-
tremal equilibria the monopolist actions no longer have a marginal impact (for example,
the monopolist may increase or decrease prices without any impact on demand). This
renders such equilibria both uninteresting and difficult to analyze. Finally, with regard
to the asymmetry: in most real world situations one platform is larger than the other.
Furthermore, in any situation with antitrust considerations this will necessarily be the
case.
3.2. Porting. In this section we shall determine the amount of software produced for
each platform of the various possible types (produced directly, ported or produced by a
mixture of those methods). In doing so, we will also have determined the ‘actual’ fixed
13This part need not be an assumption since under mild conditions, such as symmetry of the indirect
network effects and heterogeneity function, one can show there exists at least one stable equilibrium to
the subgame. However it is clearly not possible to ensure the existence of a stable interior equilibrium
in general – consider the standard symmetric case with linear heterogeneity and network effects: he only
interior equilibrium is at 0.5 and with ’strong’ network effects this equilibrium must be unstable.
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cost of software production for each platform fA, fB in terms of the fixed cost of directly
producing software for that platform and the (common) porting cost (fdX , f
p).
Lemma 3. In equilibrium only one platform has software produced directly for it. All the
software on the other platform derives from porting. Let us denote the first platform for
which software is produced directly by X and the other by X’.
Then the amount of software on X’ will be equal to the smaller of 1) the amount of
software on X (in the case where all software is ported) or 2) the level of software production
is determined by the porting cost, i.e. the level of software production is that which would
be produced with fX′ = fp. If the second case obtains, i.e. not all possible software is
ported (so the level of porting cost matters), the porting constraint will be said to bind.
Finally we have fX = fdX and, if the porting constraint binds, fX′ = f
p.
Proof. See appendix. 
Remark 4. The result that, for any given platform, all software is either produced directly
or ported may seem a little implausible. After all, in reality, we usually see software
produced directly for all platforms. It also usual for there to be substantial porting, with
the same piece of software available on multiple platforms (one could see this as multi-
homing on the software side).14 However, all that is necessary for the results in this paper
is that the marginal piece of software on the platform competing with the monopolist is
ported – in which case altering the costs of porting change the amount of software on
that platform. Thus, while the model as given may seem to be overly restrictive in its
implications the necessary result, that is that the porting constraint binds, will still hold
in the more general case.
We now make one further assumption:
Assumption: In the case of asymmetry it is the platform with larger (expected) size
for which software is produced directly.
Justification: In previous section on porting it was shown that it will always be the
case (in this model) that software on one platform has all software produced directly and
one has all software ported. Since the amount of software on the ‘porting’ platform must
14Extending the model to incorporate such an outcome is straightforward: simply allow heterogeneity in
the fixed costs of direct production for a platform (for example, one could postulate that costs follow a
uniform distribution of measure N over [0, fX ]).
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always be less than or equal to that on the ‘direct-production’ platform it is natural to
assume that it is the platform with larger (expected) size for which software is produced
directly.15
Combining these assumptions with the results of the previous section we may set fA =
fdA and fB = f
p (though we will also need to check that the porting constraint does not
bind).
3.3. Solving for Overall Equilibrium. Finally it is necessary to demonstrate the ex-
istence of an equilibrium in the overall game: that is a solution to the monopolist’s profit
maximization problem given the subgame ‘network’ equilibrium derived above. We note
that these results may not be easy to grasp when presented as generally as they are here.
The following section examines a specific case graphically and the reader may find it prof-
itable to peruse that example first before returning to the more abstract approach used
here.
Lemma 5. Having picked a stable interior equilibrium t0e ∈ E0(p0A, ...) we have associ-
ated to it a well-defined, continuous and differentiable ‘equilibrium function’ te(pA, fA, fB)
defined in a neighbourhood of t0e. In particular, restricting to changes in pA we have a
demand function:
q(pA) = te(pA) = A−1(pA)
Differentiating we have:
(1) Downward sloping demand schedule: dqdpA =
−1
A′(te(pA))t′e(pA)
< 0
(2) dtedfA < 0
(3) dtedfB > 0
Finally, though demand may be discontinuous, there exists locally a unique profit max-
imizing price.
Proof. See appendix. 
Combined with the results of the previous section the monopolist’s profit maximization
problem becomes:
15In fact if platforms displayed symmetry, i.e. direct production costs are equal and heterogeneity functions
on the two platforms are the same, this is a result rather than an assumption.
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max
pA,fp
pA · te(pA, fp)− e(fp)
We make one final additional technical assumption which allows us to rule out the
possibility of discontinuities in M’s profit function as a result of changes in porting cost:
Assumption: Pick such an asymmetric stable interior equilibrium t0e and consider the
associated equilibrium function te(pA, fp. Then that function exists and is continuous for
all values of fp up to fpB (which is the maximal value that f
p would ever be set to by M).
Corollary 6. There exists an equilibrium of the overall game, that is a price and porting
cost and an associated equilibrium level of demand te(pA, fp) which maximize the monop-
olist’s profits.
Proof. See appendix. 
3.4. Example I: Equilibrium and Demand. The situation we shall consider is one in
which the two platforms are equivalent, that is the fixed costs of software production on
the two platforms are equal and heterogeneity is symmetric (hB(1− t) = hA(t)). For the
‘network effects’ function we use the reduced form derived from a circular city model (see
appendix), that is ν(f, t) = C−
√
f
t . We set the heterogeneity function to be hA(t) = 10t
10.
This corresponds to a situation where there is a large middle ground of consumers who
are fairly indifferent between the two platforms (h(t) is small until t is close to 1) but two
‘extreme’ groups at either end who have strong preferences for their nearest platform. Set
fixed costs as follows fB = fA = 1.5. These values are chosen so as to generate a stable
asymmetric equilibrium as shown in Figure 1. Note that in its general shape (i.e. number
of equilibria, location of maxima/minima) this graph is the simplest possible that gives
rise to a stable asymmetric equilibrium.16
3.4.1. Discontinuity of demand: Since price enters A(t) linearly the diagram above also
implicitly defines the demand function in the neighbourhood of an equilibrium (an increase
in the pA shifts the A(t) curve down by that amount). A maximum of A(t) therefore
16To have an interior stable equilibrium A(t) must intersect the line y = 0 from above. If heterogeneity
is symmetric, hA(t) = hB(1− t) = h(t) then when fixed costs are equal and prices are zero, A(t) must be
anti-symmetric about 0.5, i.e. A(t) = −A(1 − t). This implies A(0.5) = 0 so 0.5 is an equilibrium. Thus
with symmetry in the network function and assuming that standardization equilibria exist (i.e. 0 and 1 are
equilibrium) the fewest crossings (i.e. interior equilibria) that lead to the existence of a stable asymmetric
equilibrium is five and we must have a situation similar to that shown.
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Figure 1. The utility advantage function, A(t) in the symmetric case
when the access prices for the two platforms are the same (so pA = 0) and
fA = fB = 1.5. There are stable equilibria at 0 and 1 (the ‘standardization’
equilibria) and 0.16 and 0.84 (asymmetric stable equilibria). There are
unstable equilibria at 0.5 and 0.02 and 0.98.
corresponds to a point at which demand is discontinuous (as price rises above the maximum
value demand jumps down as the market tips to the neighbourhood of next lowest stable
equilibrium).
An illustration of this is provided in Figure 2, which plots the demand function derived
from Figure 1 in the neighbourhood of the stable equilibrium at 0.84. Here demand
is discontinuous at a price just below 0.5 (i.e. at the left edge of the diagram – the
discontinuity itself is not shown as it distorts the scale). At the discontinuity demand
will suddenly jump down to approximately 0.14 which is the next place the line y=0.5
would intersect A(t) (see Figure 1). Note how this diagram is just the relevant portion of
Figure 1 between 0.73 and 0.84 ‘blown up’.
In all cases where there is symmetry and a stable asymmetric equilibrium A(t) must
have a bounded maximum just like it does in Figure 1. A bounded maximum in turn
implies a discontinuity in the demand function of the monopolist. Thus, in all such cases,
a monopolist will face a discontinuous demand function. This discontinuity in demand
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Figure 2. The Demand function for the monopolist in the neighbourhood
of the stable equilibrium at 0.84. Demand is discontinuous at a price just
below 0.5 (i.e. at the left edge of the diagram – the discontinuity itself is
not shown as it distorts the scale).
does not exist in the traditional linear network effects models and it functions here to
place a sharp upper bound on the price the monopolist can charge without a sudden jump
downwards in market share.
3.4.2. Other Comparative Statics: We can evaluate the effect of changing production and
porting costs by considering how it shifts A(t). In particular, increasing fixed costs of
software production for A fA will shift A(t) down and increasing fB will have the opposite
effect (note that fB is equal to the porting costs, fp if the porting constraint does not
bind). Note that unlike price, fixed costs do not enter linearly so they will also change the
shape of A(t) and not just its level.
4. Welfare
Having established the various properties of equilibrium in this section we come to the
central questions of this paper: how does the monopolist’s control of prices and the cost
of porting affect consumer and social welfare? Giving equal weight to monopoly profits
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and consumer welfare we have that total welfare, W = ΠA +WC where WC is consumer
welfare and ΠA are the monopolist’s profits.17
Lemma 7. When platform’s A size is t the marginal change in consumer welfare as a
function of platform A’s size is:
dWC
dt
= A(t) + µ(t)
where A(t) is the utility advantage of A over B defined previously
µ(t) ≡ tν ′A(t)− (1− t)ν ′B(1− t)
At an interior equilibrium te ∈ (0, 1), A(te) = 0, and this reduces to:
dWC
dt
= µ(te)
Proof. See appendix. 
Remark: A first point to emphasize is that this result (and Lemma 8 below) are entirely
general and will hold in any model in which consumer utility incorporates a ‘network
effects’ function (whether arising directly, or, indirectly as a reduced form derived from
a more complex model). That is, there is nothing that depends on the specifics of the
porting framework as presented in this paper. In particular, these results would apply
both traditional direct network effects models of communication networks and some of the
more recent models arising from a two-sided market structure.
Remark: This result means that, when at an interior equilibrium (x = te), the marginal
change in consumer welfare with respect to platform size is a function of ‘network effects’
alone (encapsulated in µ). The two basic possibilities, namely that consumer welfare is
increasing (µ(te) > 0) or that it is decreasing (µ(te) < 0) with the size of platform A have a
simple interpretation. In the first case we have a situation in which more standardization
(that is more consumers on platform A) is preferable. In the second case we have a
situation in which more symmetrical platform shares are preferable.18
17We have assumed overall profits are zero in the software industry as a result of free entry.
18There is, also the third possibility that the change in consumer welfare is zero but this is obviously a
very special case.
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What determines the sign of µ(te) – that is whether standardization or symmetry is
preferable? The answer is that it is the degree of curvature of the indirect network effects
function, ν, which in more economic terminology, is just the rate at which marginal network
effects fall with platform size (how much does a consumer benefit as the millionth person
joins a platform compared to when the tenth person joins?).
Interestingly it turns out that the dividing line between the two cases is where network
effects take the form of the natural logarithm: ν(x) = C+ ln(x). When marginal network
effects fall with platform size more gradually than this then µ > 0 and standardization is
preferable. When marginal network effects fall more strongly than this then µ < 0 and
symmetry is preferable. The classic form studied in the literature is of course where ν is
linear in which case marginal network effects do not fall at all with platform size and so
µ > 0 and standardization is preferable. Conversely, the circular city model of indirect
network effects studied in the appendix gives rise to the case where ν(x) ∝ −1/√(x). In
this case marginal network effects fall more sharply than for the logarithm and so µ < 0.19
To summarize, network effects which display weakly diminishing returns imply that
standardization (everyone on one platform) will be preferable while if network effects
show strongly diminishing returns, a more symmetric platform configuration is preferable.
Having established this we can summarize our welfare results (established formally in the
propositions below) in Table 1.
Lemma 8. At a subgame equilibrium, te, the effect on consumer welfare of an increase
in the price charged by the monopolist is negative if µ(te) ≥ 0 and is ambiguous otherwise
depending on the relative magnitudes of the monopoly pricing effect (-ve) and the network
externality (+ve). Furthermore, at an equilibrium of the overall game (i.e. where the
monopolist is profit-maximizing) the change in total welfare equals that in consumer welfare
and therefore has the same properties.
Proof. See appendix. 
19Odlyzko and Tilly (2005) provide a thoughtful critique of existing assumptions regarding the form of the
platform effects function such as that embodied in Metcalfe’s law (Metcalfe’s law corresponds to the linear
case ν(x) = x). Interestingly, as a replacement they propose using the logarithmic form, ν(x) = ln(x).
As we have just shown this is a very special case in which at an equilibrium we have µ = 0 and therefore
consumer welfare is neither increasing or decreasing in platform size. Clearly, one would like to determine
the exact form of the (indirect) platform effects function empirically. However, at least to our knowledge,
there are no economic papers which deal with this issue.
18 RUFUS POLLOCK CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY JUNE 29, 2007
Low Curvature High Curvature
Direct Impact of Higher Price - -
Indirect Impact of Higher Price - +
Overall Impact of Higher Price - O
Direct Impact of Higher Porting Cost - -
Indirect Impact of Higher Porting Cost + -
Overall Impact of Higher Porting Cost O -
Table 1. Welfare Impact of Changes in Price and Porting Cost. Curvature
refers to the Curvature of the Network Effects Function in the Neighbour-
hood of an Equilibrium. A ‘O’ indicates the effect is ambiguous in general
and will depend on the exact values of the underlying variables.
Remarks: Monopoly pricing does not result in traditional deadweight losses since
total demand is fixed and does not change (consumers who leave one platform join the
other).20 However, it does shift consumers away from the monopolist’s platform (an
effect exacerbated by the feedback from the indirect network effects). In market’s with
‘externalities’ such as these this will have consequences for welfare.
The effect of an increase in the monopolist’s price depends on two distinct factors. The
first factor is the simple one that higher prices reduce consumer welfare because consumers
pay more. The second factor is more subtle. An increase in M’s price moves consumers
off A onto B. This effect may either be negative or positive depending, respectively, on
whether a more standardization-type or a more symmetric platform configuration is better
for welfare. As shown in Lemma 7 this second condition is equivalent to asking whether
µ(te) is positive (standardization-type better) or negative (symmetric better). Thus, if
µ(te) is positive, an increase in the monopoly price by reducing the size of platform A acts
to reduce welfare. Conversely when more symmetric platform sizes are preferred then an
increase in the monopoly price by reducing the size of platform A actually acts to increase
welfare.
If we combine the two factors then we only get an unambiguous prediction (increase
in prices reduces welfare) in the first case, that is when a more standardization-type
platform configuration is preferable. In the second case, where a more symmetric platform
configuration is preferable, the effect will be ambiguous and welfare could actually rise due
to an increase in the monopolist’s prices.
20This explains why at full equilibrium marginal consumer welfare and total welfare are equal.
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Lemma 9. At a subgame equilibrium, te, the effect on consumer welfare of a increase in
porting costs is negative if µ(te) < 0 and is ambiguous otherwise depending on the relative
magnitudes of the welfare loss from a direct reduction in software provision on platform B
and the welfare gain from an increase in A’s market share. Furthermore, at an equilibrium
of the overall game (i.e. where the monopolist is profit-maximizing) the marginal effect on
total welfare equals the marginal effect on consumer welfare.
Proof. See appendix. 
Remarks: Again we have two distinct effects of higher porting costs. The first, and
the direct one, is that higher porting costs result in a reduction in availability of software
for those on platform B (and probably higher prices too – though this may depend on
the specifics of the model for software provision). This unambiguously reduces welfare
because higher porting costs mean less software for B users (holding platform B’s share
constant).
The second effect arises from the fact that, as a result of the change in software avail-
ability on B, some consumers move from platform B to platform A. This change is an
exactly similar one to that already analyzed above when discussing the effect of a price
rise (except here an increase porting cost increases the size of platform A while an increase
in price reduces the size of platform A). In particular the effect will be negative if, and
only if, µ(te) is negative (more symmetric platform configuration preferred). In this case,
both effects operate in the same direction and an increase in porting cost is unambiguously
harmful to consumer welfare. On the other hand if a more standardization-type platform
is preferable (µ(te) > 0) then this effect is positive and the overall impact on welfare will
depend on the relative magnitude of the two effects.
Lemma 10. In this second ambiguous case, it is more likely that the welfare effect is
negative:
• The larger is platform B’s market share (more consumers to suffer from the reduc-
tion on software provision on B)
• The larger is the direct impact of higher porting costs on the provision of software
for B (greater reduction on software provision on B).
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• The smaller is the impact of changes in porting cost on A’s market share.21
• The smaller is the increase in consumer welfare of an increase in A’s market share.
Proof. See appendix. 
5. Example II: Welfare
We now return to our previous specific example, this time in order to illustrate the
welfare analysis. Using it, among other results, we demonstrate that it is possible for the
welfare costs (consumer or societal) of the control of porting to be significantly greater
than the costs of monopoly pricing.
We first choose specific functional forms and values for constants. The heterogeneity
function is chosen to ensure that there exists an asymmetric stable equilibrium and is the
same as that used for figure 2 above: h(t) = 10t10.
The direct costs of software production are set to fA = 1.5 and the initial porting cost
is set to two-thirds of that value, so fp = 1.0. The monopolist’s expenditure function is:
e(fp) = 2 · (fp−1)4 and the initial value of fp when there are no efforts by the monopolist
is set to 1. The expenditure function displays diminishing returns and while initial efforts
to prevent porting are relatively cheap the cost then escalates rapidly.
The exact parameters for the functional form of the expenditure function are chosen
so that an interior ‘porting cost’ solution exists i.e. the value of porting cost obtained is
such that fA > fp and expenditure to prevent porting is non-zero and non-infinite. Using
these values we can now proceed to solve the monopolist’s problem by numerical means
and have the following results.
We find the values chosen for the two control variables are 1.419 for porting costs and
0.43 for the access price of platform A. We also calculate the profit-maximizing price M
would charge when unable to influence porting costs: 0.079. Our main interest is in the
significance of M’s choices for welfare and welfare outcomes. These, along with the values
of other significant variables, are presented in Table 1 (NB: since φ is an arbitrary constant
it has been set so that initial welfare values are normalized to zero. This value has no
21For example, if the main effect of changes in porting cost were to soften competition rather than to
directly increase A’s market share. That is, in terms of A’s demand curve, increasing porting costs
steepened the demand curve or shifted it up but did not shift it out.
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Porting
Cost
Price of A
Hardware
A’s
market
share
Net
Profits for
M
Consumer
Welfare
Total
Welfare
Initial porting
cost,
competitive
prices
1.0 0 0.758 0 0.0 0.0
Initial porting
cost, monopoly
price on A
1.0 0.079 0.704 0.056 -0.046 0.010
Monopolist
chosen porting
cost, monopoly
price on A
1.419 0.43 0.729 0.252 -0.406 -0.154
Table 2. Welfare Results at Various Prices and Porting Costs
significance since, as already explained, welfare can be changed by a fixed constant (φ).
Thus only the sizes of welfare changes can be meaningfully compared.)
The first line is there to show the baseline case, when the control parameters are at
their ‘default’ values (that is without intervention by the monopolist). In this case, M’s
market share, with its own price at zero and the fixed costs of porting at 1, is still 75%.
Total welfare and consumer welfare are the same – since prices are zero – and has been
normalized to zero.
The next line shows the situation if the monopolist can only set prices and is not able
to influence porting costs. This helps us benchmark the relative gain to a monopolist of
being able to influence porting costs in addition to setting prices. In line with theory the
welfare change is slightly positive, reflecting the reduction in the size of Network A.
The final line shows the actual outcome with the porting cost and price at the level
chosen by M to maximize its profits. Porting costs increase by almost a half to 1.42, nearly
reaching the same levels as the cost of direct production (1.5). Prices rise by over five
times compared to the situation when porting costs can not be altered demonstrating the
large impact of the Monopolist’s control of porting. Despite the far higher price, market
share for the monopolist rises though it is still lower than in the situation where neither
price nor porting cost can be set.
5.1. The Monopolist’s Profits. M gains dramatically from the ability to manipulate
porting costs, the percentage increase in profits being approximately 400% over what is
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obtained when porting costs are fixed. Moreover this is net of the costs incurred to prevent
porting, e(fp) = 0.0616, which are equal to a fifth of gross profits. The main effect of
raising porting costs is not to increase market share but to soften competition between the
two platforms and therefore permit a much higher profit-maximizing price to be charged.
Market share at the monopoly price in the two cases when porting cost is and is not
manipulatable are quite close (0.704 vs. 0.729).
5.2. Consumer welfare. The change in consumer welfare from monopoly pricing, ∆WMc =
−0.046. The change resulting from higher pricing and higher porting costs is ∆WMfc =
−0.406. Thus consumer welfare losses arising from the combination of higher porting costs
and higher prices are almost nine times as large as those arising from higher prices alone.22
5.3. Total welfare. For total welfare increasing M’s price will actually increase welfare:
with porting cost at 1, ∆WM = 0.01. However the welfare change due to the combination
of monopoly pricing and higher porting costs is decidedly negative ∆WMf = −0.156.
Thus for this case welfare costs go from barely positive to significantly negative.
5.4. Alternative Specifications. This example is of course based on only one set of
functional forms and one set of parameter values among many. It is therefore natural ask
how specific the estimates presented here are to those particular choices.
In many ways we are rather limited in what we can say: those general results that are
obtainable have already been presented in the previous section. As shown there the welfare
impact of a change in price and porting cost depend crucially on the rate of diminishing
returns of the network effects function. With strongly diminishing returns pricing has an
ambiguous impact but porting costs have a negative impact but with weakly diminishing
returns we have the converse: a negative price impact and an ambiguous impact of porting
cost.
Thus the choice of network effects function to use in a simulation will clearly influence
the estimated welfare impact. The example here uses an indirect network effects function
22As already stated, as welfare is only defined up to a constant we can only compare changes in welfare
and not levels. Nevertheless, utility is money metric (prices enter linearly) and profits are well-defined so
it is possible to convert of welfare changes into monetary terms. As a very simple ‘back-of-the-envelope’
calculation consider applying this analysis to the Microsoft case. Profits in 2000 (around the time of the
antitrust settlement in the US) were approximately $9.5 billion and in our model profits equal 0.252. Thus,
in dollar terms the change in consumer welfare from monopoly pricing alone equals approximately $1.7
billion (0.046/0.252 ·9.5), while the change in consumer welfare with both higher prices and higher porting
costs equals $15.3 billion (0.406/0.252 · 9.5).
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which displays strongly diminishing returns – and consistent with the general results we
find a weakly positive impact of pricing and a negative impact of porting cost. However if
one were to use a network effects function with weakly diminishing returns (for example
linear network effects) this would likely change the results – it would certainly make it more
likely that the pricing impact on welfare was more significant than the porting impact.23
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced ‘porting’ into a standard, two-sided, indirect network
effects model, with ‘porting’ playing a role analogous to ‘converters’ in the simpler direct
network effects models. With ‘porting’, software developed for one can be converted to
run on another platform (usually at a cost lower than that of direct production). We
examined general properties of this model, looking, in particular, at what occurs when
one (dominant) platform is controlled by a single firm, the Monopolist, who is able to
control the cost of porting to a competitor platform (at the cost of some expenditure
on the Monopolist’s part). We demonstrated the existence of a platform (and porting)
equilibrium and examined various associated properties, such as the discontinuity in the
monopolist’s demand function.
Next we turned to the question of consumer and social welfare. It was shown that, the
effect on welfare both of monopoly pricing and higher porting costs depended crucially on
the degree of diminishing returns to platform size in the indirect network effects function
(ν). If diminishing returns were weak then monopoly pricing had a negative effect on
welfare but the effect of the higher porting costs was ambiguous, while with strongly
diminishing returns the converse held, that is the effect of monopoly pricing was ambiguous
but higher porting costs had a negative effect.
Finally, we provided an illustrative example using a specific case of our model. We
showed that, in this example, the social and consumer welfare losses arising from the
control of porting combined with monopoly pricing dwarfed the welfare effects stemming
from monopoly pricing alone. In particular, consumer welfare losses from the combination
of higher porting costs and higher prices were over nine times higher than those arising
from higher prices alone. For total welfare, there was almost no effect of monopoly pricing
23In fact it would no doubt be possible to choose a model such that the ability to control porting increased
welfare – all one would need is for the benefits of platform ‘standardization’ to be sufficiently strong.
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alone but a significant reduction when the monopolist controlled both prices and porting
costs (in this second case the welfare loss was equal to approximately three fifths of the
monopolist’s profits). Of course this is a single example and without either calibrating
from empirical data or extensive robustness-checking one would not wish to use the results
for policy-making. Nevertheless, it does provide a useful example that helps put flesh on
the dry bones of the general model.
These results, taken together, have important consequences for competition policy.
They demonstrate how, in a two-sided market environment, anti-competitive behaviour
may manifest indirectly through actions taken to control porting rather than through di-
rect tying or pricing behaviour. Furthermore, for the monopolist the benefits of controlling
porting may also accrue indirectly: that is, by increasing the prices that can be charged
at a given level of demand rather than increasing demand. Returning to the examples
discussed in the introduction, we would suggest that an analysis based on the control of
porting provides a better way of understanding the effects and motivations of a dominant
firm than alternative approaches, such as those based on traditional theories of tying or
even switching costs.24
Of course from an antitrust point of view this is not enough – simply establishing a
potential ‘anti-competitive’ motivation for a firms behaviour is not sufficient to show such
actions will actually harm welfare. In this regard, as already mentioned, our central result
was that the crucial parameter to estimate is the curvature of the indirect network effects
function (that is the degree of diminishing returns to platform size). When the degree
of diminishing returns is high – the benefit of a millionth user is much less than the
thousandth – the control of porting unambiguously harms welfare but when the degree
of diminishing returns is low – the benefit of the millionth user and the thousandth user
is similar – then the control of porting has an ambiguous impact (it may even increase
welfare). Given this, the first step for an antitrust economist tasked with analyzing the
control of porting in a particular industry would be to estimate the form of the indirect
network effects function for the particular platforms under consideration.25
24Though, of course, in one sense the control of porting can be seen as a special case of tying (or the
creation of switching cost) in which the ’tie’ is not aimed at competing providers of the tied good but at
the owners of competing platforms.
25As mentioned in an earlier footnote there is little empirical evidence for the form of ‘network effects’
(whether in two-sided markets or traditional ‘network’ industries). The fact that most of the models in
the theoretical literature use a linear specification is due solely to analytical tractability and not to any
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When the control of porting does harm welfare policy-makers may wish to take steps to
reduce the control of porting by a dominant firm. One simple way to do this is to promote
‘open standards’ at the interface between the ‘software/service’ and the platform. For
example, in the case of TPMs/DRMs (Technological Protection Measures/Digital Rights
Management systems) a policy-maker could promote (or require) interoperability between
different TPM/DRM systems so that the music (‘software’ in our terminology) purchased
from any given vendor will work on any given digital music player (the platform).26 Simi-
larly, in the case of the EU dispute with Microsoft over Microsoft’s Windows Media Player,
rather than requiring unbundling the authorities could simply require that any audio for-
mats specific to Windows Media Player must be ‘open’ and freely licensable so as to ensure
that it is easy to port music and complementary services to a media player on another
platform such as Linux. The same approach would also apply to web browsers where
there already exist an extensive set of open standards developed by the W3C. Again,
rather than requiring Microsoft to unbundle Internet Explorer the authorities could sim-
ply press for ‘standards-compatibility’. In this way developers of websites and other forms
of web-services would be able to develop in a platform-neutral way (essentially the cost
of porting to a different platform such as Linux+Firefox would then be zero) with all the
associated long-run benefits for competition and consumer choice.
Finally, we mention some of potential avenues for future work. One of the most obvious
improvements that could be made would be to replace the simple monopoly model with
an oligopoly in which each platform has a profit-maximizing owner. Porting, and the
manner in which it may be controlled, have been modelled in a fairly simple manner. One
might improve this in various ways. For example, one could change from a ‘black box’ cost
function e to a setup where fA increases with fp – this would correspond to an ‘obfuscation’
situation where increasing porting costs to competitor platforms also increases the cost of
producing software on one’s own platform.
One could also add dynamics to the model (though this would also greatly increase
complexity). For example, rather than having a fixed static demand one could allow
empirical support for this functional form – a choice which, as this paper has shown, is not an innocent
one.
26At the present time this very issue of DRM interoperability is being debated both at the EU level and
in various individual European countries in relation to Apple’s FairPlay DRM.
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consumers to arrive over time.27 Alternatively consumers could make repeat purchases
but with a switching cost if a different platform were chosen in a subsequent period.
Finally, it would be interesting to explore the consequences of allowing for innovation
in software provision perhaps via the introduction of a quality ladder. Such an approach
would raise additional thorny questions about the welfare impact of monopolist behaviour
if innovation were not barrier to entry neutral. For example, if innovations while increasing
quality also made it easier to port from one platform to another (consider the case of Java
or the emergence of the web and web browsers as a fully-fledged application development
platform).28 In this case, efforts to obstruct porting would also hinder innovation, with
all the attendant consequences for welfare.
A. Proofs
A.1. Proof of Lemma 2. Recall that the conditional utility advantage of platform A
over platform B for consumer t when platform size is nA:
Aˆ(t, nA) = uA(t, nA)− uB(t, 1− nA)
and the utility advantage (function), which gives the utility advantage of platform A
over B if t is the marginal consumer (so t = nA):
A(t) = Aˆ(t, t)
Suppressing nA for the time being we shall simply write Aˆ(t).
Since ‘heterogeneity cost’ for a consumer is increasing in the distance of the consumer
from the chosen platform we have that ∀t, Aˆ′(t) < 0. Then Aˆ(tm) > 0 implies Aˆ(t) >
0,∀t ≤ tm. Conversely if Aˆ(tm) < 0 then Aˆ(t) < 0∀t ≥ tm.
Now a consumer (with expectations of platform A size equal to nA) chooses platform
A over B iff Aˆ(t) ≥ 0. Thus if a consumer with index tm chooses platform A then all
consumers with index t ∈ [0, tm] choose platform A. Similarly if a consumer with index tm
chooses platform B then all consumers with index t ∈ (tm, 1] choose platform B.
27See, for example, Cabral (2007) or the model of Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) which gives rise to limit-
pricing behaviour on the part of the monopolist.
28See e.g. Farrell and Katz (2000) on network monopolies and downstream innovation.
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In particular this immediately implies that if there exists tm ∈ [0, 1], Aˆ(tm) = 0 (and
there is at most one such solution since Aˆ′ < 0) then this is the marginal consumer and
the resulting platform size of A is tm. This is because for t ∈ [0, tm], Aˆ(t) > 0 so these
consumers choose platform A while for t ∈ (tm, 1], Aˆ(t) < 0 so these consumers choose
platform B.
For the extremal cases by the same arguments if Aˆ(0) < 0 then all consumers choose
platform B and if Aˆ(1) > 0 then all consumer’s choose platform A.
Furthermore, only one of these alternatives is possible so there is a unique implied
platform size for any given assumed nA. Thus one may define a function f : [0, 1]→ [0, 1]
where for a given assumed platform size, n, f(n) is the resulting implied platform size.
Imposing rational expectations then implies that nA is an equilibrium if and only if nA
is a fixed point of f . But nA is a solution of f(n) = n⇔ nA ∈ E. QED
Remark: Equilibria t ∈ E−0 are often termed standardization or tipping equilibria as
they involve all consumers joining a single platform.
Remark: This result sets up an implicit equivalence between platform size and the
marginal consumer (where the term marginal is broadened to include the tipping situations
where tm = 0 or 1 and A(tm) 6= 0
Stability of Equilibria: Suppose we have equilibrium tm ∈ E0 with A′(tm) < 0.
Suppose that there is a perturbation in expectations so that a platform size of tm +  is
expected instead of tm (where  > 0). Since A′ < 0 we must have Aˆ(tm + , tm + ) =
A(tm + ) < 0. Now in the interior all functions are continuous so Aˆ is continuous. Thus
δ in the region tm +  we have that Aˆ(x, tm + ) < 0 for x ∈ (tm + − δ, tm + ]. But then
all consumers with indices in that range wish to leave platform A and go to platform B.
Repeating this process we converge back to the equilibrium tm. The analogous argument
for negative  shows the equilibrium is stable to perturbation downwards in expectations.
Thus the equilibrium is stable.
The exact same form of argument applied to an equilibrium tm ∈ E−0 shows that it too
is stable. QED.
A.2. Proof of Lemma 5. Proof of existence: Fix an equilibrium t0e ∈ E0(p0A, ...)
then we can define te(pA, ...) by picking te ∈ E(pA, ...) consistent with t0e. Since A(t)
is continuously differentiable so too will be te(pA, ...) (at least almost everywhere – see
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below). For notational convenience whenever a parameter is fixed we shall drop it from
the list of arguments to t, A, ....
Differentials: implicitly differentiate the equation A(t) = 0 with respect to the relevant
variable (pA, fA, fB). Since increasing A’s price by dp shifts the A(t) curve down by dp
reducing te the sign of the differential is as stated. Similarly increasing fA shifts the
platform advantage curve down and therefore the advantage curve down reducing te and
therefore the differential with respect to fA must be negative (and conversely for fB).
Remarks on discontinuity and profit maximization: Fix fA, fB, then te(pA) =
A−1(pA) is the demand function faced by M. From the previous result we know this is
downward sloping. Now take a stable equilibrium t0 when pA = 0 and assume there exists
an adjacent non-extremal equilibrium t0
′ ≤ t0 (which must be unstable). Then there
must exist a maximum of A(t) at t1 ∈ (t0′ , t0) with A′(t1) = 0 and the demand function
te(pA)(te(0) = t0) is discontinuous at t1 with pdA = A(t
1).
Despite this there will still exist a profit maximizing price pdA > p
m
A since
lim
t→t1+
A−1(t) = −∞
A.3. Proof of Lemma 6. Set all of M’s control variables to their initial value. Suppose
first there are no discontinuities in M’s demand function. This occurs iff there exists no
zeroes of A′(t), i.e iff A(t) is monotonic. Since we assume existence of a stable interior
equilibria must have that A(t) is downward sloping. Thus we have a downward sloping
demand function. This gives a well-defined and continuous profit function on a compact
set (demand space extends only from 0 to 1). Thus the profit function has a maximum
which it attains somewhere on the set. QED.
Again, set all of M’s control variables to their initial value. So assume that there
there is a discontinuity in the demand function, i.e. that there exists a t with A′(t) = 0.
Pick an interior stable equilibrium. Then by Lemma 5 there exists an associated well-
defined demand function. Furthermore, there exists locally a unique profit-maximizing
price which occurs prior to any discontinuous jump (downwards) in the demand function.
But this ensures the existence of equilibrium in the overall game since it means that at
any discontinuity in the demand function the profit function is downwards sloping. QED.
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A.4. Proof of Lemma 3 (Porting Lemma).
Proposition 11. Suppose that a platform has a piece of software produced directly for it.
Then sX , psX are determined by f
d
X (the direct cost of software production) alone. We may
therefore take fX = fdX in all the formulas obtained above (it is immaterial for the purposes
of calculating all equilibrium values whether software is ported or produced directly for this
platform).
Proof. The cost of porting is less than the cost of direct production. Thus as long as one
software firm enters directly it must be the profit condition of that firm that binds (i.e.
is zero). This condition alone determines the total number of software firms and software
prices. 
Clearly if no firm produces directly there can be no porting as there would be nothing
to port.
Proposition 12. If porting is possible in both directions and both platforms have some
software produced directly then both platforms have the same amount of software produced
for them.
Proof. If software is produced directly then all software that could have ported must have
been (since it is cheaper to port). Let d, p (d′, p′) be the amount of directly produced
software and ported software respectively on A (B). Then sA = d+ p but p′ = d, p = d′ so
sA = sB. 
If this is the case it requires fdAnB = nAf
d
B since s
2
Xf
d
X = nX . This is a strong condition
which is unlikely to be satisfied. Thus we assume:
Assumption: fdAnB 6= nAfdB
This assumption immediately implies the converse of the previous proposition, namely
that that software is produced directly for at most one platform.
A.5. Proof of Welfare-Related Propositions. Consumer welfare as a function of plat-
form A’s size (t) is given by (for simplicity φ is omitted):
WC(t) = −t · pA + tνA(t) + (1− t)νB(1− t)−
∫ t
0
hA(x)dx−
∫ 1
t
hB(x)dx
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Moving to total welfare we need only add in the relevant expression for ΠA = t · pA −
e(fp). Thus:
W = t · pA − e(fp)− t · pA + tνA(t) + (1− t)νb(1− t)−
∫ t
0
hA(t)dt−
∫ 1
t
hB(t)dt
A.5.1. Proof of Lemma 7. Differentiating consumer welfare with respect to t yields:
dWC
dt
= −pA + νA(t)− νB(1− t)− hA(t) + hB(1− t) + tν ′A(t)− (1− t)ν ′A(1− t)
This simplifies to (A(t) is the utility advantage of A over B defined previously):
dWC
dt
= A(t) + tν ′A(t)− (1− t)ν ′B(1− t) = A(t) + µ(t)
where we have defined:
µ(t) = tν ′A(t)− (1− t)ν ′B(1− t)
At an equilibrium te, A(te) = 0, so this reduces to:
dWC
dx
= µ(te)
QED.
A.5.2. Proof of Lemma 8.
dWC
dpA
= −t+ dt
dpA
dWC
dt
Considered at an asymmetric equilibrium the second term will be greater than or less
than zero depending on whether µ is less than or greater than zero. If µ is non-negative
then the second term is negative and total sum will be negative. If µ is negative the
total sum will be ambiguous (depending on the relative magnitudes of the two terms).
Thus, if network effects do not show very strong diminishing returns (and so µ is non-
negative) welfare changes negatively with increasing price. If µ is negative (as it would in
the circular city model) then the effect on consumer welfare depends on the relative size
of the monopoly pricing costs (first term) versus the network externality (second term).
Turning to total welfare we have:
dW
dpA
=
dΠA
dpA
+
dWC
dpA
=
dt
dpA
(pA +
dWC
dt
)
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The term outside the brackets is negative but again here the second term can have
either positive or negative sign in general. NB: when the monopolist is profit maximizing
the differential of monopolist profits with respect to price is zero. Thus, the differential of
total welfare equals the differential of consumer welfare.
A.5.3. Proof of Lemma 9. The change in consumer welfare as a consequence of an increase
in the cost of porting is:
dWC
dfp
= (1− t)dνB
dfp
+
dt
dfp
dWC
dt
The first term is clearly negative since software provision on platform B declines as
porting costs go up. The analysis of the second term is similar to the case of a change in
price. As platform A’s market share increases as porting costs increase the second term
will be greater than or less than zero depending on whether µ is greater than or less than
zero. Thus, if µ is less than zero (strongly diminishing marginal network effects) the total
will be unambiguously negative and consumer welfare declines with increases in porting
costs. If µ is positive then the total has ambiguous sign in general, and will depend on
relative sizes of the two terms.
For total welfare we have:
dW
dfp
=
dΠA
dfp
+
dWC
dfp
When profit-maximizing the first term is zero and the differential of total welfare equals
that of consumer welfare. When not at a profit-maximizing level of porting costs the first
term is positive. In this case whether the total is positive or negative will depend on the
specific circumstances.
A.6. Proof of Lemma 10. The stated results all follow by straightforward examination
of changes in the sizes of the various terms in the proof of Lemma 9 above.
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B. Software Production
There are two main methods of modelling product variety in the literature. One based
on monopolistic competition and one based on locational models. The monopolistic com-
petition approach has already been extensively used to demonstrate indirect network ef-
fects in hardware/software systems (see e.g. Church and Gandal (1992); Church, Gandal,
and Krause (2003)). One can also use an approach based on locational differentiation and
that is the approach we adopt here.
Software firms on platform X have fixed costs fX and marginal costs csX . Marginal costs
are assumed to be constant across the two platforms but fixed costs are not. Because
software production involves a fixed cost it cannot be provided competitively. Instead we
introduce a locational model of product differentiation and imperfect competition
For each platform, software ‘space’ is represented as a circle (of circumference 1). Soft-
ware firms are assumed to locate symmetrically (and therefore equidistantly) in this
space.29 while consumers are distributed uniformly over it (so total demand for soft-
ware on platform X is the total number of consumers on that platform: nX). Following
the standard circular city model30 we have consumer’s (expected) utility from software
consumption is:
usX(sX , p
s
X) = −E[d(x(sX))]− psX
Where d is a ‘travel’ cost function of all locational models, x(sX) is the distance a
consumer is from the nearest software, and E is the expectation operator. Average travel
cost is used because it is assumed that consumers make their decision when they do not
yet know their exact position in software space relative to software producers. Thus they
base their decisions on expected costs (which will be common across consumers). We shall
assume a linear travel cost, d(x) = kx.
B.1. Solving. The main result can be stated in the form of a lemma:
Lemma 13. Given expected platform sizes neX the equilibrium level of software production,
associated prices, and software utility are:
29Firms’ location decisions could be endogenized and this outcome derived as an equilibrium configuration
– see Economides (1989) However we choose to take this as an assumption for the sake of simplicity.
30See e.g. Tirole (1988) for details.
THE CONTROL OF PORTING IN TWO-SIDED MARKETS 33
sX =
√
kneX
fX
pX = csX +
√
kfX
neX
usX(sX , p
s
X) = −csX −
5
4
√
kfX
neX
Proof. The setup is exactly the same as the textbook circular city model (see e.g. Tirole
1988) except that demand rather than being 1 is equal to the expected market size of
that platform: neX . This leaves prices unchanged (since the shape of demand curve is
unchanged), so in equilibrium: pX = csX +
k
sX
where k is the cost of travel (d(x) = kx).
Firms locate equidistantly and each face the same level of demand equal to total demand
divided by the number of software firms. To determine the number of software firms we
use the free entry condition which means that in equilibrium firms earn zero net profits –
i.e. they cover fixed costs:
(pX − csX)
neX
sX
− f = 0⇒ kn
e
X
s2X
− f = 0⇒ sX =
√
kneX
f
This in turn gives:
pX = csX +
√
kf
neX
The form of the software utility functions in our particular case? Consumers do
not know the exact location of firms in advance so they base their decisions on the expected
distance from a software producer. Software firms locate randomly but equidistantly on the
circle and consumers are uniformly distributed thus expected distance between a consumer
and the nearest software is a quarter of the distance between firms. Distance between firms
is the inverse of the number of firms, sX . We therefore have:
usX(sX , p
s
X) = −psX − k(
1
4sX
)
Substituting the values for pX , sX we have31:
31The result for the quadratic distance case would be:
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usX(sX , p
s
X) = −csX −
5
4
√
kf
neX

Remark: Since the constant 5
√
k
4 can be absorbed into fixed cost fX this variable will
be omitted in future and we have:
usX(sX , p
s
X) = −csX −
√
f
neX
We can now substitute this expression for usX to obtain:
Corollary 14. The reduced form of the utility function is:
uX(t) = φ− p− hX(t)− csX −
√
fX
neX
Remark: Note how this shows that the model displays indirect network effects as the
reduced form expression for utility displays positive feedback between the total number of
consumers on X and the utility of an individual on X: us
′
X > 0 (differentiating with respect
to neX).
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